With the spiritual turmoil of the last couple of years, I find this simple song expresses where my heart is.
Jerusalem, My Destiny
I have set my eyes on your hills,
Jerusalem, my Destiny.
Though I cannot see the end for me
I cannot turn away.
We have set our hearts for the way;
This journey is our destiny.
Let no one walk alone.
This journey makes us one.
Thursday, March 20, 2008
Tuesday, March 18, 2008
Wednesday, March 5, 2008
How McCain needs to campaign against Obama
If Obama is the Democratic candidate, there is, imo, only one way to win against him. No, it won't be to go negative as Hillary has. Maybe that will work for her, who knows, but it won't work for McCain. I think a negative campaign by a Republican against the mild-mannered Obama will be a disaster.
And McCain doesn't need to harp too long on the experience factor. Everyone knows how long McCain's been around and how long Obama hasn't. People aren't too sure long experience in Washington is such a great asset, anyway. One of the things McCain has going for him is that he's been a maverick; he's been different. Harping on Obama's lack of experience may end up hurting McCain in the long run, since he needs to look "fresh" and different than the present administration. So a few reminders of experience should do the trick there.
What McCain needs to do is tackle the issues. Over, and over, and over again. Simply line up the issues and show where they differ and how he (McCain) is going to achieve his goals. The reason this could work is simple. When all the dust has settled and the stirring oratories are getting less fresh and effective, people are going to realize Obama is simply a very liberal democrat of the old school.
I once thought Obama was a lightweight on substance. I've read through pages and pages on his website and now know he has very definite ideas about the changes he wants to see. (He's still weak on details, especially how you pay for all this stuff, but he's got definite goals at any rate.) The problem, at least for those of us on the conservative side of the spectrum, is that he holds the same agenda as every liberal for the past 40 years. The failed policies of Carter. The "government as nanny" policies of Clinton et al, and the liberal social agenda of Ted Kennedy. All rolled into one.
In the end, many Republicans who have been sickened by the present administration may very well wake up to the fact that replacing one political extreme with the opposite isn't going to change things the way they hope. Things will still be hopelessly deadlocked and polarizing politics will continue to reign. I think some eyes will open to the facts of national security, immigration, our moral duty in Iraq, the idiocy of turning health care over to the government, and all the other issues that Republicans tend to feel strongly about. People are going to take another look at McCain. Yes, the Bush administration has screwed things up royally, but what we need is a concerted effort to come together in the middle.
So McCain needs to show America exactly what Obama is. A nice, well-spoken, passionate, and very liberal, Democrat. Nothing more, nothing less. Not the "enemy," not evil, not anything except wrong on where this country needs to go. We don't need to go off the cliff on the other side. We need to find common ground. I believe McCain has the potential to do just that, in fact has already proven he can. With someone in the White house willing to work on both sides of the aisle, maybe we can truly get something done on these issues.
I hope Republican, and independents and moderate Democrats as well, can see the need for a moderate in the White House and give McCain a chance. And I hope McCain can see that his best bet to get there is to simply lay the facts out and let the people decide.
And even if McCain doesn't win, America will benefit greatly from a campaign run on the issues instead of negative emotions.
And McCain doesn't need to harp too long on the experience factor. Everyone knows how long McCain's been around and how long Obama hasn't. People aren't too sure long experience in Washington is such a great asset, anyway. One of the things McCain has going for him is that he's been a maverick; he's been different. Harping on Obama's lack of experience may end up hurting McCain in the long run, since he needs to look "fresh" and different than the present administration. So a few reminders of experience should do the trick there.
What McCain needs to do is tackle the issues. Over, and over, and over again. Simply line up the issues and show where they differ and how he (McCain) is going to achieve his goals. The reason this could work is simple. When all the dust has settled and the stirring oratories are getting less fresh and effective, people are going to realize Obama is simply a very liberal democrat of the old school.
I once thought Obama was a lightweight on substance. I've read through pages and pages on his website and now know he has very definite ideas about the changes he wants to see. (He's still weak on details, especially how you pay for all this stuff, but he's got definite goals at any rate.) The problem, at least for those of us on the conservative side of the spectrum, is that he holds the same agenda as every liberal for the past 40 years. The failed policies of Carter. The "government as nanny" policies of Clinton et al, and the liberal social agenda of Ted Kennedy. All rolled into one.
In the end, many Republicans who have been sickened by the present administration may very well wake up to the fact that replacing one political extreme with the opposite isn't going to change things the way they hope. Things will still be hopelessly deadlocked and polarizing politics will continue to reign. I think some eyes will open to the facts of national security, immigration, our moral duty in Iraq, the idiocy of turning health care over to the government, and all the other issues that Republicans tend to feel strongly about. People are going to take another look at McCain. Yes, the Bush administration has screwed things up royally, but what we need is a concerted effort to come together in the middle.
So McCain needs to show America exactly what Obama is. A nice, well-spoken, passionate, and very liberal, Democrat. Nothing more, nothing less. Not the "enemy," not evil, not anything except wrong on where this country needs to go. We don't need to go off the cliff on the other side. We need to find common ground. I believe McCain has the potential to do just that, in fact has already proven he can. With someone in the White house willing to work on both sides of the aisle, maybe we can truly get something done on these issues.
I hope Republican, and independents and moderate Democrats as well, can see the need for a moderate in the White House and give McCain a chance. And I hope McCain can see that his best bet to get there is to simply lay the facts out and let the people decide.
And even if McCain doesn't win, America will benefit greatly from a campaign run on the issues instead of negative emotions.
Sunday, March 2, 2008
The role of government
This election year has caused me to ponder a lot of questions about the true role of government in our daily lives, as well as their role in national and international affairs. Here are random questions and thoughts, which may or may not make sense.
* Ours is a democratically elected government of a pluralistic society. That means, in part, that no one part of society gets special treatment.
* So what role should that government play in things such as protection of one segment of society from abuse of another? Obviously, we've decided no one should discriminate on the basis of race, creed, or sex. Who decides what constitutes "abuse" of one party by another?
* Can it be argued that the government's job is to see to the welfare of the country? At all costs? At some cost? In other words, can't it be argued that if it is in the country's best interest to protect it's oil supply, it should do so?
* Who decides what's in the county's best interest? The voters? A 51% majority? The courts?
This is what is stumping me, but I'm not able to articulate it well. I've been reading how the government shouldn't legislate "morality." You can't force people to make what other people think are the "right" or moral choices in life. Abortion, homosexual rights, and stem cell research are just a few examples. But at the same time, social justice issues are seen as the proper domain for the federal government. Welfare, food stamps, child care, health care, education, head start, etc. We've tried affirmative action as well as other social programs to level the playing field. Isn't that legislating morality, too?
Is the job of government to ensure their international trading is "fair" trade? If we say it is in the best interest of any country to deal compassionately with other countries and peoples, aren't we making moral judgments and therefore asking our governments to legislate morality instead of ensure the safety and survival of the country? What about illegal immigration? Should we possibly weaken our defenses and drain our resources by dealing "compassionately" with those who have come here to seek a better life? Perhaps immigrants are making the country a better place, but I think it can be argued rather effectively that that's not a universal truth and there are real and costly problems involved. Should compassion for an individual (or even many individuals) dictate national policy? Should it dictate how everyone must deal with something like this on a national level? Isn't it best to accommodate the needs of the many, not the few? Isn't that legislating morality?
It just seems we want to pick and choose what we see as the legitimate moral grounds for the federal government. Most, if not all of you who read my sporadic blog should know me at least a little. Yes, I have a conservative bent in politics and social issues. But I'm letting my mind run here, and I want help thinking through this issue of what is the legitimate role of government and who has the right to chose which areas the government meddles in, and which it doesn't?
Here is a concrete example. Should a government be compassionate at all costs? Isn't it the federal governments' primary job to secure our borders and to keep our country safe? If you don't see that as a primary function, what do you think the primary function is?
* Ours is a democratically elected government of a pluralistic society. That means, in part, that no one part of society gets special treatment.
* So what role should that government play in things such as protection of one segment of society from abuse of another? Obviously, we've decided no one should discriminate on the basis of race, creed, or sex. Who decides what constitutes "abuse" of one party by another?
* Can it be argued that the government's job is to see to the welfare of the country? At all costs? At some cost? In other words, can't it be argued that if it is in the country's best interest to protect it's oil supply, it should do so?
* Who decides what's in the county's best interest? The voters? A 51% majority? The courts?
This is what is stumping me, but I'm not able to articulate it well. I've been reading how the government shouldn't legislate "morality." You can't force people to make what other people think are the "right" or moral choices in life. Abortion, homosexual rights, and stem cell research are just a few examples. But at the same time, social justice issues are seen as the proper domain for the federal government. Welfare, food stamps, child care, health care, education, head start, etc. We've tried affirmative action as well as other social programs to level the playing field. Isn't that legislating morality, too?
Is the job of government to ensure their international trading is "fair" trade? If we say it is in the best interest of any country to deal compassionately with other countries and peoples, aren't we making moral judgments and therefore asking our governments to legislate morality instead of ensure the safety and survival of the country? What about illegal immigration? Should we possibly weaken our defenses and drain our resources by dealing "compassionately" with those who have come here to seek a better life? Perhaps immigrants are making the country a better place, but I think it can be argued rather effectively that that's not a universal truth and there are real and costly problems involved. Should compassion for an individual (or even many individuals) dictate national policy? Should it dictate how everyone must deal with something like this on a national level? Isn't it best to accommodate the needs of the many, not the few? Isn't that legislating morality?
It just seems we want to pick and choose what we see as the legitimate moral grounds for the federal government. Most, if not all of you who read my sporadic blog should know me at least a little. Yes, I have a conservative bent in politics and social issues. But I'm letting my mind run here, and I want help thinking through this issue of what is the legitimate role of government and who has the right to chose which areas the government meddles in, and which it doesn't?
Here is a concrete example. Should a government be compassionate at all costs? Isn't it the federal governments' primary job to secure our borders and to keep our country safe? If you don't see that as a primary function, what do you think the primary function is?
Wednesday, February 20, 2008
Our Moral Duty in Iraq
This article is bang-on, in my opinion. From America: The National Catholic Weekly
Our Moral Duty in Iraq
How would U.S. withdrawal affect the Iraqi people?
By Gerard F. Powers | FEBRUARY 18, 2008
Last year 14 Catholic Democrats sent a letter about Iraq to the U.S. Catholic bishops. After citing church leaders’ just war arguments against the original intervention, Tim Ryan, Rosa DeLauro, Marcy Kaptur and their colleagues concluded that it is time “to seek an end to this injustice.” They urged the bishops to support their efforts to force a withdrawal of U.S. troops as a way to “bring an end to this war.”
If it was immoral to intervene in Iraq in the first place, is it immoral to stay? Even Hillary Clinton, who supported the intervention, has claimed that Barack Obama is inconsistent because he opposed the intervention but later supported funding for U.S. troops to remain. Clearly, the ethics of intervention and the ethics of exit are related. The widespread, and correct, belief that the original intervention was illegitimate, the lack of broad international support and the failure to tie the toppling of a brutal regime in Iraq to a realistic and clear post-intervention plan have contributed to the debacle there. That said, as Bishop William Skylstad, then president of the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, emphasized in November, the focus now should be “more on the ethics of exit than on the ethics of intervention,” for the two, while related, are distinct. A just war can lead to an unjust peace; less often, an unjust war can lead to a just peace. Today’s challenge in Iraq is to ensure that an unjust war does not lead to an unjust peace.
Many in the antiwar camp fail to acknowledge that the United States bears a moral burden to help Iraqis build a just peace, a burden made heavier precisely because the war is unjust. As an uninvited occupying power, the United States has assumed a whole set of moral obligations to promote the common good of the Iraqi people until Iraqis can take control of their own affairs.
Legally, the United States is no longer occupying Iraq, but by almost any measure Iraq is a failed state. Morally, therefore, the United States retains significant residual responsibilities to Iraqis. The Iraq intervention may have been an optional, immoral war; but given the U.S. government’s shared responsibility for the ensuing crisis, its continued engagement is not an optional moral commitment.
What Matters Morally?
Others calling for U.S. withdrawal acknowledge the ethics of exit, but give too much weight to an ethic of efficacy (Is U.S. intervention working?) over an ethic of responsibility (What do we owe Iraqis?).
Boston College School of Theology & Ministry: An int'l theological center preparing leaders for the church in the 21st century.
Efficacy must be part of any moral analysis of Iraq. At a forum sponsored by Fordham’s Center on Religion and Culture and Notre Dame’s Kroc Institute, the ethicist Michael Walzer, a vocal opponent of the Iraq intervention, argued that “we are consequentialists for the moment. Neither staying on nor leaving Iraq is a categorical imperative” (see http://kroc.nd.edu/events/07fordhamevent.shtml).
Unlike many in the debate, Walzer is clear about the breadth of moral obligations that exist in Iraq and thus the range of consequences that matter morally. According to Walzer, “We have to figure out a strategy that produces the least bad results for the Iraqi people, for other people in the Middle East, and for American soldiers.”
Arguments for withdrawal tend to give most weight to what is good for U.S. soldiers (and, I would add, U.S. interests). It would be morally irresponsible not to take into account legitimate U.S. interests, not least our moral obligations to the small percentage of Americans who are helping to shoulder the burden in Iraq, and the moral costs of spending more than $2 billion per week on the war while other pressing needs go unmet.
Moral clarity about what we owe ourselves is often not matched by moral clarity about what we owe Iraqis. The Catholic Democrats and presidential candidates who rally antiwar support by equating a withdrawal of U.S. troops with “ending the war” in Iraq define the “ought” mostly without reference to the Iraqi people. Proposals to de-authorize and stop funding the war and to set strict timetables for redeployment might “end the war” for Americans. But would they end the war between Sunnis and Shiites? Would they end the insurgency, the Al Qaeda terrorist attacks or the widespread criminality in Iraq?
The moral question, then, is not the one put by Senator John Warner to Gen. David Petraeus: What policies and strategies will best serve U.S. national security interests? Rather, it is: What policies and strategies will best serve the interests and well-being of the Iraqi people?
What the United States Owes the Iraqis
When U.S. obligations to Iraqis are taken into account, they are often defined in a minimalist way, such as: combatting terrorist groups in Iraq; training and equipping Iraqi security forces; providing reconstruction assistance; pressing Iraqis to meet benchmarks for political “reconciliation”; taking in more Iraqi refugees, including those who have supported U.S. efforts; protecting the Kurds; and deterring Iranian aggression or regional instability. These are legitimate goals, but they do not seem commensurate with the magnitude of the needs of the Iraqi people, especially for security.
Despite the fact that ensuring order is the primary responsibility of an occupying power, the Bush administration did not make protecting Iraqi civilians a priority until the “surge.” The leading Democratic presidential candidates are clear that protecting civilians is not a U.S. obligation, despite abundant evidence that Iraqi security forces cannot do it alone. The inadequacy of such minimalist goals is clearer when tied to early deadlines for withdrawal. Senator Carl Levin, the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, argues that such deadlines would force Iraqis “to look into the abyss” of a civil war. Would proponents of this high stakes game of chicken be so confident of its efficacy or be so willing to impose the burden of moral risk on a long-victimized Iraqi people if their calculations began with a more robust understanding of U.S. ethical responsibilities to Iraqis?
Despite the obvious difficulties involved, the original U.S. objectives of building an Iraq that is “peaceful, united, stable, democratic and secure” are closer to what the United States owes Iraqis than are the minimalist alternatives. I would state the U.S. responsibilities more robustly than the Democratic presidential candidates have outlined or the Bush administration has pursued in practice. There are four: (1) not to end all political violence, but to ensure that an Iraqi government can maintain a reasonable degree of security for the whole country and minimize the threat of chaos or civil war; (2) not to impose a Western-style democracy, but to facilitate establishment of a stable, fairly representative government that respects basic human rights, especially minority rights; (3) not to promote a U.S.-style capitalist economy, but to restore Iraq’s infrastructure and a viable economy that serves Iraqi needs, not U.S. interests, especially not U.S. oil interests; and (4) not to stay without the consent of a legitimate Iraqi government, or, lacking that, the United Nations.
Even if one accepts this understanding of U.S. obligations, isn’t there a time when our obligations expire? Last October, a House resolution concluded that, “after more than four years of valiant efforts by members of the Armed Forces and United States civilians, the Government of Iraq must now be responsible for Iraq’s future course.” Such a short timetable seems less the product of a sober assessment of what it takes to succeed in the daunting nation-building project the United States has undertaken, and more a reflection of the lack of patience and long-term commitment to deal with the aftermath of interventions that is often evident in U.S. foreign policy. Had there been a realistic plan in Iraq, would it be reasonable to expect a stable, united Iraq with an agreed constitution, a revived economy and a respected and effective government that could survive on its own—all that in five years? The fact that Iraq is a mostly failed state wracked by violence is not an argument for withdrawal, but evidence of just how far the United States is from meeting its moral responsibilities.
After almost five years of multiple U.S. missteps, misdeeds and miscalculations, serious doubts arise about whether the United States has the capacity, the competence, the moral credibility or the confidence of the Iraqi people needed to do a better job. The United States has seriously failed Iraq; but past failure need not beget future failure, nor does it absolve us of our obligations. Given what is at stake, the Bush administration (and its successor) must do more to put Iraqi interests first, to commit the necessary resources (especially for protection of Iraqi civilians and for reconstruction), to engage Iraq’s neighbors and the international community, and to pursue new approaches that offer a better chance of meeting U.S. obligations. Those calling for an “end to the war” also have a heavy burden. They must show that, despite the U.S. obligations and the risks associated with failing to fulfill them, there is nothing more that can be done.
Has the Burden Been Met?
Many believe that the burden has been met. How can the United States continue to be held responsible, antiwar advocates ask, when Iraqis remain mired in sectarian conflicts born of ancient hatreds? Iraqis ultimately are responsible for resolving their deep divisions. The United States, however, is hardly a disinterested humanitarian entity, offering what Fouad Ajami has called the “foreigner’s gift” of freedom. Instead, the United States supported Iraq in its war against Iran and during Saddam Hussein’s genocide against the Kurds. The United States devastated Iraq during the 1991 war and the ensuing embargo, overthrew its government in 2003 and displayed gross negligence and incompetence in dealing with the aftermath. The U.S. role in Iraq might not be “ancient,” but it is a part of the “hatreds” there.
Decoupling the United States from Iraq’s hatreds is a complex matter. A precipitous U.S. withdrawal could end the war for the United States, but only for a while. Many analysts warn that a spiral of violence that could fill a vacuum left by an ill-timed U.S. withdrawal might necessitate a reintervention by the United States on humanitarian and security grounds. If the United States were not already in Iraq, there would be a clamor for humanitarian intervention to end the strife, which the World Health Organization estimates killed 151,000 Iraqis between 2003 and June 2006. One cannot criticize the United States and the international community for not intervening to stop the sectarian strife in Darfur, while insisting that disengagement is the appropriate response to sectarian strife in Iraq (strife which, unlike Darfur, is both a direct and indirect result of U.S. actions).
The Best Antiwar Argument
Paradoxically, a failure to take seriously the distinction between the ethics of intervention and the ethics of exit, and to give an ethic of responsibility proper weight in the moral analysis, could undermine the original moral case against the war. The legitimate desire to end U.S. military engagement in a costly war with no end in sight has led many antiwar advocates to embrace a type of moral reasoning that is all too similar to that which they rejected when it was used by the Bush administration to justify the war. The Bush administration discarded traditional just war norms and launched a preventive war on the grounds that it was necessary to protect U.S. interests. Opponents of continued U.S. involvement must be careful not to discard norms governing U.S. responsibilities to the Iraqi people on the grounds that U.S. withdrawal is necessary to protect U.S. interests.
The Bush administration’s case was based on best-case scenarios: a preventive war would prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction to terrorists, and Iraq would quickly become a model democracy in the Middle East. Opponents countered that war in the world’s most volatile region would unleash the kind of uncontrollable, unintended consequences that have, in fact, ensued. If such realistic assessments of the risks of negative consequences were a reason for opposing the original intervention, they should also be a reason for opposing too rapid a withdrawal. Hopes that things could not get worse in Iraq might be tragically misplaced and deadlines might backfire. Reliance on best-case scenarios got us into our current predicament; it is not a strategy for getting us out of it.
The strongest argument against the Iraq intervention was that preventive wars are wars of aggression, which often become wars of occupation. And wars of occupation often degenerate into wars of repression, as the occupier resorts to indiscriminate and disproportionate force, emergency measures (even torture) and other heavy-handed tactics to pacify a resistant population. Wars of occupation, moreover, invariably involve a sustained, extremely difficult, long-term commitment to nation building that is at odds with U.S. political culture. Holding the Bush administration to this high standard of moral responsibility—rather than suggesting that responsibilities to Iraqis can easily be overridden by U.S. interests and by calculations of necessity and efficacy—would help hold the line on preventive war in the future.
Given the fears generated by terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction, such preventive wars will remain all too tempting and all too easy for the United States, if it is not required to bear the burden of what it has wrought.
The best antiwar argument must address two moral failures in Iraq, not just one: it was immoral to intervene; in the ensuing nation-building process, the United States has failed the Iraqi people by willing an end (a peaceful and prosperous Iraq) without willing the means to achieve it.
A preoccupation with what is good for U.S. troops and U.S. interests, coupled with speculative, short-term assessments of success and necessity, could compound this double moral failure. Those who say that it is too late and too costly to fix what we have broken must not forget what we owe Iraqis, lest they too readily impose on Iraqis alone the risks of a serious humanitarian, security and political crisis if the U.S. withdraws too soon. The antiwar position must find a better balance between an ethics of efficacy and an ethics of responsibility, between meeting U.S. needs and interests and Iraqi needs and interests. Some might still conclude that strict deadlines for withdrawal are called for. I doubt it. But at least then withdrawal would be pursued, not with self-righteous calls to “end” an immoral war, but with a deep sense of anguish, remorse and foreboding over our nation’s failure to live up to its obligations to the Iraqi people.
The moral question is: What policies and strategies best serve the interests of the Iraqi people?
Gerard F. Powers, director of policy studies at the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame, is a former director of the Office of International Justice and Peace of the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops
Our Moral Duty in Iraq
How would U.S. withdrawal affect the Iraqi people?
By Gerard F. Powers | FEBRUARY 18, 2008
Last year 14 Catholic Democrats sent a letter about Iraq to the U.S. Catholic bishops. After citing church leaders’ just war arguments against the original intervention, Tim Ryan, Rosa DeLauro, Marcy Kaptur and their colleagues concluded that it is time “to seek an end to this injustice.” They urged the bishops to support their efforts to force a withdrawal of U.S. troops as a way to “bring an end to this war.”
If it was immoral to intervene in Iraq in the first place, is it immoral to stay? Even Hillary Clinton, who supported the intervention, has claimed that Barack Obama is inconsistent because he opposed the intervention but later supported funding for U.S. troops to remain. Clearly, the ethics of intervention and the ethics of exit are related. The widespread, and correct, belief that the original intervention was illegitimate, the lack of broad international support and the failure to tie the toppling of a brutal regime in Iraq to a realistic and clear post-intervention plan have contributed to the debacle there. That said, as Bishop William Skylstad, then president of the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, emphasized in November, the focus now should be “more on the ethics of exit than on the ethics of intervention,” for the two, while related, are distinct. A just war can lead to an unjust peace; less often, an unjust war can lead to a just peace. Today’s challenge in Iraq is to ensure that an unjust war does not lead to an unjust peace.
Many in the antiwar camp fail to acknowledge that the United States bears a moral burden to help Iraqis build a just peace, a burden made heavier precisely because the war is unjust. As an uninvited occupying power, the United States has assumed a whole set of moral obligations to promote the common good of the Iraqi people until Iraqis can take control of their own affairs.
Legally, the United States is no longer occupying Iraq, but by almost any measure Iraq is a failed state. Morally, therefore, the United States retains significant residual responsibilities to Iraqis. The Iraq intervention may have been an optional, immoral war; but given the U.S. government’s shared responsibility for the ensuing crisis, its continued engagement is not an optional moral commitment.
What Matters Morally?
Others calling for U.S. withdrawal acknowledge the ethics of exit, but give too much weight to an ethic of efficacy (Is U.S. intervention working?) over an ethic of responsibility (What do we owe Iraqis?).
Boston College School of Theology & Ministry: An int'l theological center preparing leaders for the church in the 21st century.
Efficacy must be part of any moral analysis of Iraq. At a forum sponsored by Fordham’s Center on Religion and Culture and Notre Dame’s Kroc Institute, the ethicist Michael Walzer, a vocal opponent of the Iraq intervention, argued that “we are consequentialists for the moment. Neither staying on nor leaving Iraq is a categorical imperative” (see http://kroc.nd.edu/events/07fordhamevent.shtml).
Unlike many in the debate, Walzer is clear about the breadth of moral obligations that exist in Iraq and thus the range of consequences that matter morally. According to Walzer, “We have to figure out a strategy that produces the least bad results for the Iraqi people, for other people in the Middle East, and for American soldiers.”
Arguments for withdrawal tend to give most weight to what is good for U.S. soldiers (and, I would add, U.S. interests). It would be morally irresponsible not to take into account legitimate U.S. interests, not least our moral obligations to the small percentage of Americans who are helping to shoulder the burden in Iraq, and the moral costs of spending more than $2 billion per week on the war while other pressing needs go unmet.
Moral clarity about what we owe ourselves is often not matched by moral clarity about what we owe Iraqis. The Catholic Democrats and presidential candidates who rally antiwar support by equating a withdrawal of U.S. troops with “ending the war” in Iraq define the “ought” mostly without reference to the Iraqi people. Proposals to de-authorize and stop funding the war and to set strict timetables for redeployment might “end the war” for Americans. But would they end the war between Sunnis and Shiites? Would they end the insurgency, the Al Qaeda terrorist attacks or the widespread criminality in Iraq?
The moral question, then, is not the one put by Senator John Warner to Gen. David Petraeus: What policies and strategies will best serve U.S. national security interests? Rather, it is: What policies and strategies will best serve the interests and well-being of the Iraqi people?
What the United States Owes the Iraqis
When U.S. obligations to Iraqis are taken into account, they are often defined in a minimalist way, such as: combatting terrorist groups in Iraq; training and equipping Iraqi security forces; providing reconstruction assistance; pressing Iraqis to meet benchmarks for political “reconciliation”; taking in more Iraqi refugees, including those who have supported U.S. efforts; protecting the Kurds; and deterring Iranian aggression or regional instability. These are legitimate goals, but they do not seem commensurate with the magnitude of the needs of the Iraqi people, especially for security.
Despite the fact that ensuring order is the primary responsibility of an occupying power, the Bush administration did not make protecting Iraqi civilians a priority until the “surge.” The leading Democratic presidential candidates are clear that protecting civilians is not a U.S. obligation, despite abundant evidence that Iraqi security forces cannot do it alone. The inadequacy of such minimalist goals is clearer when tied to early deadlines for withdrawal. Senator Carl Levin, the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, argues that such deadlines would force Iraqis “to look into the abyss” of a civil war. Would proponents of this high stakes game of chicken be so confident of its efficacy or be so willing to impose the burden of moral risk on a long-victimized Iraqi people if their calculations began with a more robust understanding of U.S. ethical responsibilities to Iraqis?
Despite the obvious difficulties involved, the original U.S. objectives of building an Iraq that is “peaceful, united, stable, democratic and secure” are closer to what the United States owes Iraqis than are the minimalist alternatives. I would state the U.S. responsibilities more robustly than the Democratic presidential candidates have outlined or the Bush administration has pursued in practice. There are four: (1) not to end all political violence, but to ensure that an Iraqi government can maintain a reasonable degree of security for the whole country and minimize the threat of chaos or civil war; (2) not to impose a Western-style democracy, but to facilitate establishment of a stable, fairly representative government that respects basic human rights, especially minority rights; (3) not to promote a U.S.-style capitalist economy, but to restore Iraq’s infrastructure and a viable economy that serves Iraqi needs, not U.S. interests, especially not U.S. oil interests; and (4) not to stay without the consent of a legitimate Iraqi government, or, lacking that, the United Nations.
Even if one accepts this understanding of U.S. obligations, isn’t there a time when our obligations expire? Last October, a House resolution concluded that, “after more than four years of valiant efforts by members of the Armed Forces and United States civilians, the Government of Iraq must now be responsible for Iraq’s future course.” Such a short timetable seems less the product of a sober assessment of what it takes to succeed in the daunting nation-building project the United States has undertaken, and more a reflection of the lack of patience and long-term commitment to deal with the aftermath of interventions that is often evident in U.S. foreign policy. Had there been a realistic plan in Iraq, would it be reasonable to expect a stable, united Iraq with an agreed constitution, a revived economy and a respected and effective government that could survive on its own—all that in five years? The fact that Iraq is a mostly failed state wracked by violence is not an argument for withdrawal, but evidence of just how far the United States is from meeting its moral responsibilities.
After almost five years of multiple U.S. missteps, misdeeds and miscalculations, serious doubts arise about whether the United States has the capacity, the competence, the moral credibility or the confidence of the Iraqi people needed to do a better job. The United States has seriously failed Iraq; but past failure need not beget future failure, nor does it absolve us of our obligations. Given what is at stake, the Bush administration (and its successor) must do more to put Iraqi interests first, to commit the necessary resources (especially for protection of Iraqi civilians and for reconstruction), to engage Iraq’s neighbors and the international community, and to pursue new approaches that offer a better chance of meeting U.S. obligations. Those calling for an “end to the war” also have a heavy burden. They must show that, despite the U.S. obligations and the risks associated with failing to fulfill them, there is nothing more that can be done.
Has the Burden Been Met?
Many believe that the burden has been met. How can the United States continue to be held responsible, antiwar advocates ask, when Iraqis remain mired in sectarian conflicts born of ancient hatreds? Iraqis ultimately are responsible for resolving their deep divisions. The United States, however, is hardly a disinterested humanitarian entity, offering what Fouad Ajami has called the “foreigner’s gift” of freedom. Instead, the United States supported Iraq in its war against Iran and during Saddam Hussein’s genocide against the Kurds. The United States devastated Iraq during the 1991 war and the ensuing embargo, overthrew its government in 2003 and displayed gross negligence and incompetence in dealing with the aftermath. The U.S. role in Iraq might not be “ancient,” but it is a part of the “hatreds” there.
Decoupling the United States from Iraq’s hatreds is a complex matter. A precipitous U.S. withdrawal could end the war for the United States, but only for a while. Many analysts warn that a spiral of violence that could fill a vacuum left by an ill-timed U.S. withdrawal might necessitate a reintervention by the United States on humanitarian and security grounds. If the United States were not already in Iraq, there would be a clamor for humanitarian intervention to end the strife, which the World Health Organization estimates killed 151,000 Iraqis between 2003 and June 2006. One cannot criticize the United States and the international community for not intervening to stop the sectarian strife in Darfur, while insisting that disengagement is the appropriate response to sectarian strife in Iraq (strife which, unlike Darfur, is both a direct and indirect result of U.S. actions).
The Best Antiwar Argument
Paradoxically, a failure to take seriously the distinction between the ethics of intervention and the ethics of exit, and to give an ethic of responsibility proper weight in the moral analysis, could undermine the original moral case against the war. The legitimate desire to end U.S. military engagement in a costly war with no end in sight has led many antiwar advocates to embrace a type of moral reasoning that is all too similar to that which they rejected when it was used by the Bush administration to justify the war. The Bush administration discarded traditional just war norms and launched a preventive war on the grounds that it was necessary to protect U.S. interests. Opponents of continued U.S. involvement must be careful not to discard norms governing U.S. responsibilities to the Iraqi people on the grounds that U.S. withdrawal is necessary to protect U.S. interests.
The Bush administration’s case was based on best-case scenarios: a preventive war would prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction to terrorists, and Iraq would quickly become a model democracy in the Middle East. Opponents countered that war in the world’s most volatile region would unleash the kind of uncontrollable, unintended consequences that have, in fact, ensued. If such realistic assessments of the risks of negative consequences were a reason for opposing the original intervention, they should also be a reason for opposing too rapid a withdrawal. Hopes that things could not get worse in Iraq might be tragically misplaced and deadlines might backfire. Reliance on best-case scenarios got us into our current predicament; it is not a strategy for getting us out of it.
The strongest argument against the Iraq intervention was that preventive wars are wars of aggression, which often become wars of occupation. And wars of occupation often degenerate into wars of repression, as the occupier resorts to indiscriminate and disproportionate force, emergency measures (even torture) and other heavy-handed tactics to pacify a resistant population. Wars of occupation, moreover, invariably involve a sustained, extremely difficult, long-term commitment to nation building that is at odds with U.S. political culture. Holding the Bush administration to this high standard of moral responsibility—rather than suggesting that responsibilities to Iraqis can easily be overridden by U.S. interests and by calculations of necessity and efficacy—would help hold the line on preventive war in the future.
Given the fears generated by terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction, such preventive wars will remain all too tempting and all too easy for the United States, if it is not required to bear the burden of what it has wrought.
The best antiwar argument must address two moral failures in Iraq, not just one: it was immoral to intervene; in the ensuing nation-building process, the United States has failed the Iraqi people by willing an end (a peaceful and prosperous Iraq) without willing the means to achieve it.
A preoccupation with what is good for U.S. troops and U.S. interests, coupled with speculative, short-term assessments of success and necessity, could compound this double moral failure. Those who say that it is too late and too costly to fix what we have broken must not forget what we owe Iraqis, lest they too readily impose on Iraqis alone the risks of a serious humanitarian, security and political crisis if the U.S. withdraws too soon. The antiwar position must find a better balance between an ethics of efficacy and an ethics of responsibility, between meeting U.S. needs and interests and Iraqi needs and interests. Some might still conclude that strict deadlines for withdrawal are called for. I doubt it. But at least then withdrawal would be pursued, not with self-righteous calls to “end” an immoral war, but with a deep sense of anguish, remorse and foreboding over our nation’s failure to live up to its obligations to the Iraqi people.
The moral question is: What policies and strategies best serve the interests of the Iraqi people?
Gerard F. Powers, director of policy studies at the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame, is a former director of the Office of International Justice and Peace of the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops
Tuesday, February 12, 2008
Obama- let's all get a grip here
From this week's The Week magazine
Obama: Is he the second coming of JFK?
“The arc of Barack Obama’s rise has passed through three distinct phases,” said Shailagh Murray in The Washington Post. First he was the intriguing newcomer. Then he was a serious challenger. As he continues to battle
Hillary Clinton for the Democratic nomination, inspiring crowds and preaching the politics of hope, Obama has entered phase three, with some Democrats proclaiming him as the spiritual successor to one of the Democratic Party’s greatest heroes—John F. Kennedy. Like JFK, said Eileen McNamara in The Boston Globe, Obama “was a relative unknown only four years before he boldly sought the presidency.” Like JFK, he’s got youth, vigor, and eloquence. His endorsement by two of the country’s most famous
Kennedys last week cemented the comparison. “There was a time when another young candidate was running for president and challenged America to cross a new frontier,” said Sen. Edward Kennedy. JFK’s daughter, Caroline, declared, “We need a change in the leadership of this country—just as we did in 1960.”
Oh, please, said Sean Wilentz in the Los Angeles Times. Sure, Obama has JFK’s optimism and charisma. But in terms of credentials, there’s no comparison. “By the time JFK ran for president, he had served three terms in the House and twice won election to the Senate.” A decorated World War II veteran, he closely studied foreign affairs, and served on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Obama’s eight years in the Illinois legislature and uncompleted single Senate term can’t hold a candle to that record. His lack of experience calls to mind what another great Democrat, Harry Truman, advised JFK when he ran in 1960: “May I urge you to be patient?”
Kennedy didn’t heed that advice, said David Brooks in The New York Times, and neither should Obama. Another Clinton presidency would only plunge us back into the political bitterness that began with the culture wars of the late 1960s. Obama, on the other hand, promises a return to the nonpartisan idealism of Kennedy’s New Frontier. He’s calling America to take “the high road,” to transcend differences, to embrace service instead of selfishness. At times, said Evan Thomas in Newsweek, Obama does have an almost
eerie ability to channel JFK with speeches that “make audiences weep with longing and nostalgia” for a less cynical age.
As an Obama volunteer myself, said Robert Baird in the Chicago Tribune, I find this generational nostalgia more creepy than moving. Kennedy was elected nearly a half-century ago, and the youngest people to have voted for him are now 68. Marketing Obama as the candidate of the future by linking him to the past is more than a little ironic. Besides, being likened to JFK isn’t necessarily flattering, said Froma Harrop in The Providence Journal. Kennedy was, at best, a very flawed president, given to reckless behavior and mistakes borne of inexperience and youthful arrogance. “The more we learn about his Camelot, the less perfect it sounds.”
Still, the media really loves the idea of Obama as the second coming of JFK, said Howard Kurtz in The Washington Post. Chalk that up to a serious case of “Kennedy envy.” Today’s young journalists know that the country was in thrall to JFK’s charisma and his wit, and they’re thrilled at the idea of covering an Obama presidency. Those same reporters and pundits, on the other hand, are thoroughly sick of the Clintons. Let’s all please remember that this election, like all elections, is about the future, not the past, said Ellen Goodman in The Boston Globe. “It’s not about who will be the next Kennedy, but rather the next president.”
Obama: Is he the second coming of JFK?
“The arc of Barack Obama’s rise has passed through three distinct phases,” said Shailagh Murray in The Washington Post. First he was the intriguing newcomer. Then he was a serious challenger. As he continues to battle
Hillary Clinton for the Democratic nomination, inspiring crowds and preaching the politics of hope, Obama has entered phase three, with some Democrats proclaiming him as the spiritual successor to one of the Democratic Party’s greatest heroes—John F. Kennedy. Like JFK, said Eileen McNamara in The Boston Globe, Obama “was a relative unknown only four years before he boldly sought the presidency.” Like JFK, he’s got youth, vigor, and eloquence. His endorsement by two of the country’s most famous
Kennedys last week cemented the comparison. “There was a time when another young candidate was running for president and challenged America to cross a new frontier,” said Sen. Edward Kennedy. JFK’s daughter, Caroline, declared, “We need a change in the leadership of this country—just as we did in 1960.”
Oh, please, said Sean Wilentz in the Los Angeles Times. Sure, Obama has JFK’s optimism and charisma. But in terms of credentials, there’s no comparison. “By the time JFK ran for president, he had served three terms in the House and twice won election to the Senate.” A decorated World War II veteran, he closely studied foreign affairs, and served on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Obama’s eight years in the Illinois legislature and uncompleted single Senate term can’t hold a candle to that record. His lack of experience calls to mind what another great Democrat, Harry Truman, advised JFK when he ran in 1960: “May I urge you to be patient?”
Kennedy didn’t heed that advice, said David Brooks in The New York Times, and neither should Obama. Another Clinton presidency would only plunge us back into the political bitterness that began with the culture wars of the late 1960s. Obama, on the other hand, promises a return to the nonpartisan idealism of Kennedy’s New Frontier. He’s calling America to take “the high road,” to transcend differences, to embrace service instead of selfishness. At times, said Evan Thomas in Newsweek, Obama does have an almost
eerie ability to channel JFK with speeches that “make audiences weep with longing and nostalgia” for a less cynical age.
As an Obama volunteer myself, said Robert Baird in the Chicago Tribune, I find this generational nostalgia more creepy than moving. Kennedy was elected nearly a half-century ago, and the youngest people to have voted for him are now 68. Marketing Obama as the candidate of the future by linking him to the past is more than a little ironic. Besides, being likened to JFK isn’t necessarily flattering, said Froma Harrop in The Providence Journal. Kennedy was, at best, a very flawed president, given to reckless behavior and mistakes borne of inexperience and youthful arrogance. “The more we learn about his Camelot, the less perfect it sounds.”
Still, the media really loves the idea of Obama as the second coming of JFK, said Howard Kurtz in The Washington Post. Chalk that up to a serious case of “Kennedy envy.” Today’s young journalists know that the country was in thrall to JFK’s charisma and his wit, and they’re thrilled at the idea of covering an Obama presidency. Those same reporters and pundits, on the other hand, are thoroughly sick of the Clintons. Let’s all please remember that this election, like all elections, is about the future, not the past, said Ellen Goodman in The Boston Globe. “It’s not about who will be the next Kennedy, but rather the next president.”
Thursday, February 7, 2008
The Recycling Myth- a Swede reveals the other side
This is an interesting read:
The Recycling Myth
I love reading the "other" side of the "accepted wisdom." Not that I'm against recycling, but I like to see issues discussed completely.
If your interested, you can google the results of a new European study that says biofuels are a losing proposition. Duh!
The Recycling Myth
I love reading the "other" side of the "accepted wisdom." Not that I'm against recycling, but I like to see issues discussed completely.
If your interested, you can google the results of a new European study that says biofuels are a losing proposition. Duh!
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